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Mexico’s Año Horrible:
Global Crisis Stings Economy
By Edward C. Skelton and Erwan Quintin
Over the past few months, 
optimism has been replaced 
by increasingly dire 
predictions for the 
country’s near-term 
economic outlook.
Until last September, the global econom-
ic slump was expected to take a fairly limit-
ed toll on the Mexican economy. There was 
even talk of decoupling—that, for once, a 
U.S. recession would leave Mexico relatively 
unscathed. Over the past few months, how-
ever, this optimism has been replaced by 
increasingly dire predictions for the coun-
try’s near-term economic outlook.
This deterioration is hardly surprising. 
The global crisis intensified markedly in 
September 2008, and the true magnitude 
of the slowdown began to emerge. World 
trade flows dried up, which is particularly 
damaging for nations like Mexico whose 
economic activity depends critically on ex-
ports. At the same time, international finan-
cial uncertainty led investors to withdraw 
capital from emerging markets. 
As if that weren’t enough, Mexico was 
confronted with a number of idiosyncratic 
shocks: a crackdown on drug cartels and 
local corruption, a flu epidemic and trade 
disputes with its most important partner. 
The result of this confluence of bad news 
and bad luck is that Mexico is experiencing 
a truly horrible 2009.
But even this darkest of clouds has a 
silver lining. Twenty years ago, circumstanc-
es such as these almost surely would have 
caused a financial collapse in Mexico. To 
date, none has occurred. In fact, recent data 
suggest the financial system is exhibiting 
stability even as a severe recession plagues 
the country. This resilience demonstrates 
the strides Mexico has made toward reduc-
ing its financial vulnerability.
Anatomy of a Recession
Officially, the U.S. recession began in 
December 2007. Yet, Mexico’s economy 
continued to expand for much of 2008. 
Through November of that year, most fore-
casts for 2009 gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth called for Mexico to avoid recession 
(Chart 1). Forecasters cited Mexico’s strong 
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such as Germany and Japan, now ranks 
among the countries hardest hit by the 
global slump. When exports collapse, in-
dustrial output is never far behind. Despite 
talk of possible decoupling last year, Mex-
ico is once again tracking the U.S. almost 
step for step in industrial output (Chart 2B).
Weakening economic activity has ac-
celerated job destruction. As tends to be the 
case during severe contractions, employer-
initiated job terminations are rising (Chart 3). 
Recent research has demonstrated the im-
portance of this indicator.1 During tranquil 
times, job flows are a natural part of well-
functioning labor markets. During deep 
macroeconomic fundamentals and lack of 
exposure to the problems afflicting the U.S. 
and Europe. 
Forecasts of decreasing economic ac-
tivity gained momentum after the beginning 
of 2009. Since then, however, forecasts for 
growth have tumbled well into negative ter-
ritory. Mexico’s economy is now expected 
to contract by over 6 percent this year.
Recent data support this pessimism. 
Surprisingly resilient for a while, Mexican 
exports plunged—as they inevitably do 
when U.S. manufacturing activity weakens 
(Chart 2A). This is a big reason Mexico, to-
gether with other trade-dependent nations 
Chart 2
Exports and Industrial Production Plummet
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vis the dollar, a depreciation not seen in 
Mexico since December 1994.
Also reminiscent of pre-Tequila ten-
sions is the vast amount of foreign reserves 
the central bank is spending trying to con-
tain peso pressures. Since the peso weak-
ness began in October, the central bank has 
provided almost $20 billion in liquidity to 
ease peso volatility. 
Evidence of capital flight also material-
ized in the cost of the country’s debt. The 
premium Mexico pays relative to compa-
rable U.S. instruments more than tripled last 
fall. Although the initial spike has moder-
ated, Mexican debt is still significantly more 
expensive than in recent years.
As a result of these financial disrup-
tions, some firms have reported difficulties 
getting credit through standard means. 
The central bank, federal government and 
development banks have all taken steps to 
ensure businesses can obtain the working 
capital they need.  
It’s important to note that Mexico is 
not alone in this financial predicament. 
The response to last fall’s global financial 
turbulence mirrors what often happens in 
a global crisis: Investors, perceiving height-
ened risk, pull their money out of emerging 
markets. 
Currencies have depreciated sharply 
and country risk premia have risen since 
last August throughout the emerging world 
slumps, however, many workers are forced 
to move to occupations and sectors for 
which their skills may be ill-suited, resulting 
in productivity losses. 
  Further cutting into growth in Mexico 
is the weak labor market in the U.S. Money 
sent home by Mexican workers in the U.S., 
called remittances, plunged 20 percent in 
the 12 months ending in May. The impact 
fell largely on poorer families. 
A 2009 Banco de México survey point-
ed to a key factor in the falling remittances: 
Mexicans in the U.S. are disproportionately 
employed in sectors that have declined 
most dramatically, with construction a 
prominent example.2 
Uncertain employment and income 
prospects, domestic shocks and the loss of 
help from relatives in the U.S. have greatly 
weakened Mexican consumer confidence 
and spending. 
Unfortunately, consumers aren’t the 
only ones cutting back. Domestic invest-
ment has dropped over 10 percent since 
October, which bodes ill for the country’s 
near-term outlook. Even foreign direct 
investment, a typically resilient engine of 
Mexico’s growth and one of Mexico’s strong 
suits over the past two decades, is heading 
in the wrong direction.
‘Tequila’-Size Slump 
This litany of depressing economic news 
made bad GDP numbers inevitable. Indeed, 
recent readings have been jaw-dropping. 
The last quarter of 2008 seemed disas-
trous enough, with an annualized decline of 
10 percent. But the pace of contraction more 
than doubled in the first quarter of 2009 
(Chart 4). In the second quarter—a period 
affected by the swine flu scare—real out-
put fell by 4.5 percent. The contraction has 
slowed, but it remains quite steep. Economic 
activity is 10 percent below its level at the 
same time last year.
To put things in historical perspective, 
Mexico hasn’t experienced a GDP contrac-
tion like this since its infamous Tequila Crisis 
of the mid-1990s. The episode’s name refers 
to the economic hangover that resulted from 
an abrupt drop in the peso’s value. What 
worries some observers is that the magni-
tude of the current downturn isn’t the only 
similarity with the Tequila Crisis. 
Last fall, when the global economic 
picture took a turn for the worse, the peso 
suddenly collapsed as Mexico’s borrowing 
costs soared. Between August and April, 
the peso lost 40 percent of its value vis-à-
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share of GDP. Back then, Mexico’s financial 
system lacked the type of regulatory, risk 
management and legal infrastructure neces-
sary to support credit growth and a healthy 
financial environment.  
In addition, banks were highly ex-
posed to currency risks because many of 
their liabilities were denominated in U.S. 
dollars. The collapse of the peso in Decem-
ber 1994, together with jumps in interest 
rates and inflation, put tremendous stress 
on bank balance sheets, eventually leading 
to a full-blown banking crisis.
Experience is a harsh tutor, and Mexico 
learned the lessons taught by the earlier 
financial system collapse.5 
Banks have lowered their exposure to 
currency movements by reducing their dol-
lar borrowing. They also measure risk much 
more effectively than in the mid-1990s and 
are considered well-capitalized under inter-
national accounting standards. Furthermore, 
financial system authorities have spent a 
great deal of time and energy modernizing 
supervision. Transparency has greatly im-
proved as financial authorities have imple-
mented regulations and accounting practices 
consistent with, and in many cases more 
stringent than, international standards.6
Prospects for Improvement
When is Mexico likely to emerge from 
this deep recession? 
For the most part, Mexico’s troubles 
(Chart 5). In other words, there’s nothing 
Mexico-specific about this capital flight.  
More important, Mexico is in a far 
stronger position to deal with these shocks 
today than it was prior to the Tequila Crisis.
Greater Policy Discipline
As recently as 20 years ago, the col-
lection of real and financial shocks now 
confronting Mexico would have set off debt 
defaults and a banking crisis. To date, noth-
ing of the sort has occurred.
Since the Tequila Crisis, Mexico has 
displayed a steadfast commitment to mon-
etary and fiscal discipline.3 This has enabled 
the country to stop relying on short-term, 
foreign-currency-denominated debt. It now 
routinely issues 10-, 20- and 30-year peso-
denominated, fixed-interest bonds. As a re-
sult, Mexico no longer lives and dies with the 
mood swings of fickle foreign investors.  
The banking sector is in much better 
shape than it was in the early 1990s, adding 
to the country’s stability. Although currently 
on the rise, problem loans are a fraction of 
what they were even five years ago. And 
Mexico’s banking system has little direct 
exposure to toxic assets.4
Mexico’s banking system, in fact, bears 
little resemblance to what it looked like in 
1994. At that time, the banks had just been 
privatized under a poorly designed auc-
tion process. In the five years leading up to 
the Tequila Crisis, credit quadrupled as a 
Chart 4
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result from the global slump. Therefore, 
improvement should materialize when the 
global economy—and the U.S. in particular—
begins to recover.
Most forecasters expect the world 
economy to shrink 1 to 2 percent this year, 
bringing about the first global recession 
since World War II.7 Next year should bring 
positive, if small, numbers for world output 
growth. The U.S. economy is expected to 
contract 2 to 3 percent this year and grow 
at a slow pace next year.
The short-term outlook is worse for 
Mexico than the U.S. Because of its heavy 
reliance on exports and the country-spe-
cific shocks it’s experiencing, the Mexican 
economy is expected to retreat 6 percent or 
more this year. Growth should turn positive 
by the end of 2009 but remain weak.
While Mexico awaits a turnaround in 
global economic activity, policymakers are 
trying to mitigate the effects of the contrac-
tion without compromising their dedication 
to policy discipline. 
Mexico was slow to use monetary poli-
cy to respond to the deteriorating conditions 
because the weakening peso threatened 
price stability. Once the peso stabilized and 
inflation began to wane, the central bank 
aggressively lowered the overnight interest 
rate. The rate is down 375 basis points since 
January, leaving it at 4.5 percent. 
Mexico responded more quickly with 
fiscal policy, passing a stimulus package at the 
Chart 5
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end of 2008. However, the government’s fiscal 
challenges greatly constrain its ability to spend 
during downturns.8 Mexico depends heav-
ily on oil prices for revenue because its large 
informal economy limits its ability to raise 
taxes. Consequently, the eventual size of the 
stimulus package is likely to be rather small. 
After maintaining a near-balanced budget over 
the previous few years, Mexico’s Congress ap-
proved a budget deficit of 1.8 percent of GDP 
for 2009.
Despite Mexico’s año horrible, the 
country’s remarkable efforts to reduce its 
financial vulnerability have enhanced its 
ability to deal with large economic shocks. 
Mexico’s economy has been bloodied but 
has avoided collapse, thanks to prudent 
policymaking and a much improved finan-
cial system. 
At the same time, Mexico has yet to 
address many areas of vulnerability. The na-
tion’s economic activity remains highly de-
pendent on external forces. Mexico still rises 
and falls with the U.S. Rumors of decoupling, 
it seems, have been greatly exaggerated.
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